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International law is not made of discrete events, like a treaty-signing ceremony, the
passage of legislation, or a diplomatic summit. Instead, international law is an iterative
lawmaking process engaging numerous "transnational" actors as lawmakers. Indeed, as
an international scholar, I feel like a storyteller, developing colorful characters and
recounting undulating plots with surprising twists and turns.1 One such story involves
consular notification rights-the rights of detained foreign nationals who have become
wards of a foreign country's criminal justice system to communicate with their home
country upon detention to request, among other things, legal assistance. The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention") 2 enshrines these rights, and
an Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention ("Optional Protocol") 3 anoints the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") as a protector of such rights.
In the United States, with common crimes a creature of state law, and with local or
state law enforcement officials typically responsible for arrest and detention, the state
(not federal) criminal justice system is the principal gatekeeper of foreign nationals'
Vienna Convention rights. We thus confront a quintessential question of international
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; Yale Law School (J.D., 1994); Yale
University (M.A., 1994); Princeton University (A.B., 1990). I would like to thank Lyn Entzeroth for her
guidance on habeas corpus issues. I would also like to thank The University of Tulsa College of Law for
providing financial support for this project. This symposium piece is based on my 2004-2005 Supreme Court
Review Symposium presentation. See Janet Koven Levit, Prof. of Law, Presentation, Medellin v. Dretke: The
Enforceability of International Treaty Obligations in State Criminal Proceedings, (U. Tulsa College of L.,
Tulsa, Okla., Dec. 9, 2005). This symposium piece was drafted and in production long before the Supreme
Court decided Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 620 (2005) (mem.), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 620 (2005)
(mem.), as well as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (mem.), two cases which undoubtedly bear on
some of the analysis herein. Portions of this symposium piece have been reprinted with permission from Tulsa
Journal of Comparative and International Law.
1. See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade
Finance Instruments, 30 Yale J. Intl. L. 125 (2005); Janet Koven Levit, The Dynamics of International Trade
Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, 45 Harv. Intl. L.J. 65 (2004).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Apr. 24, 1963), 21 U.S.T. 77 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
3. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes (Apr. 24, 1963), 596 U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]; see generally Janet
Koven Levit, A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the Role of State Courts in
Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 Tulsa J. Comp. & Intl. L. 163, 166 n. 21 (2004).
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law's effect within a federal system: To what extent are individual states bound to
enforce, often in the face of procedural hurdles, an international treaty entered into and
ratified by the federal government? This was essentially the question that the United
States Supreme Court decided to review in Medellin v. Dretke.4 Its resolution not only
promised clarification of the Vienna Convention's practical effect within the United
States but also illumination of an international treaty's on-the-ground impact when issues
of state law are at stake. Thus, Medellin became one of this Term's most-anticipated
cases.
I hoped in accepting this invitation to write about Medellin v. Dretke that we would
now be discussing the climax of this consular notification rights story. Yet, this hope
turned elusive. The Court dismissed the case for improvidently granting certiorari; 5 thus,
the Court in Medellin writes a very minor chapter in the saga. Yet, the Vienna
Convention narrative is far from over; it continues to evolve with a center of activity that
has shifted, at least for the time being, from the U.S. Supreme Court to the executive
branch, as well as lower federal courts, state courts, and even local police departments.
Whether the Court reasserts itself is an open question for subsequent Terms and
subsequent symposia. What is patently clear, however, is that transnational actors, other
than the Court, will continue to play a leading and constitutive role in the consular
notification rights story.
II. CONSULAR NOTIFICATION RIGHTS
A. International Court of Justice
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that detaining officials must inform
a foreign national "without delay" 6 of his right to request that his consulate be informed
of the detention; 7 and foreign consulates must be free to communicate with, visit, and/or
arrange legal representation for foreign nationals. 8 State parties to the Convention are
obligated to give "full effect" 9 to the aforementioned rights. Significantly for Josd
Medellin, the Optional Protocol, which the United States not only ratified but also
drafted (and championed), 10 anoints the ICJ as the venue to consider all "[d]isputes
arising out of the interpretation or application" of the Convention.11
4. 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (per curiam).
5. Id. at 2092.
6. Vienna Convention, supra n. 2, at art. 36(1)(b).
7. Id.
8. Id. at arts. 36(l)(a), 36(1)(c).
9. Vienna Convention, supra n. 2, at art. 36(2).
10. Optional Protocol, supra n. 3. The United States Senate ratified the Vienna Convention and Optional
Protocol on October 12, 1969, and President Nixon proclaimed the treaty's entry into force on January 29,
1970. 115 Cong. Rec. 30997 (1969); see also Report of the United States Delegation to the Vienna Conference
on Consular Relations, in Sen. Exec. E., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (May 8, 1969). Interestingly, the United States
was the first country to bring a case to the ICJ under the Optional Protocol. See United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (US. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 5, 24-26. For the current status of the Optional Protocol
in the United States, see infra n. 108 and accompanying text.
11. Optional Protocol, supra n. 3, at art. I.
[Vol. 41:193
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The concern behind Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is that a foreign national
is a stranger to the detaining country's criminal justice system. A consular official may
be able to guide the accused through language, cultural, legal, and procedural hurdles; to
use diplomatic cachet to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the detainee (or even an
extradition to the home country); and to arrange more competent legal representation
than the detaining country often provides. Vienna Convention rights are reciprocal,
offering precious comfort to United States citizens when traveling abroad, often to
countries with criminal justice systems that offer less procedural protections than our
own. 12
In practice in the United States, detaining officials are typically members of state
and local law enforcement agencies, and these officials often do not inform foreign
national detainees of their Vienna Convention rights. By the time a foreign national
raises the Vienna Convention transgression, the criminal prosecution often has
progressed to a point where state procedural bar rules impede a court's ability to
entertain Vienna Convention-related claims. Thus, in the United States, courts often do
not have the opportunity to contemplate Vienna Convention violations and any
concomitant prejudice to the foreign national.
Foreign states have become particularly angered when their foreign nationals
receive death sentences without being informed of their Vienna Convention rights in a
timely fashion, thereby spurring a flurry of Vienna Convention-related litigation in the
ICJ pursuant to the Optional Protocol. In the first case, the State of Virginia executed a
Paraguayan foreign national, Angel Francisco Breard, a few days after Paraguay filed a
petition with the ICJ arguing that, in allowing Virginia to execute Mr. Breard without
affording Vienna Convention protections, the United States had violated its obligations
under the Vienna Convention. 13 In response to a habeas petition in United States federal
court following the ICJ petition, the U.S. Supreme Court held, per curiam, that while the
Vienna Convention "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance
following arrest," 14 the ICJ's provisional order requesting a stay would not trump either
state or federal procedural default rules. 15
12. SeeA TravelAdvisory, 154 N.Y. Times A20 (Mar. 14, 2005).
13. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994). In 1993, the State of Virginia convicted Mr.
Breard, a Paraguayan national, of attempted rape and capital murder and soon thereafter sentenced him to
death. Id. at 673. Paraguay argued in its April 3, 1998 ICJ petition that the United States violated the Vienna
Convention on account of the Virginia authorities' failure to notify Breard of his right to contact the
Paraguayan consulate; consequently, Virginia should, among other things, stay the scheduled April 14, 1998
execution pending an ICJ decision on the merits of Paraguay's case. Request for the Indication of Provisional
Measures, Order (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248. Breard had been procedurally barred from raising the Vienna
Convention issues in his habeas proceedings. Id. at 249; see also Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th
Cir. 1998). On April 9, 1998, just five days before the scheduled execution, the ICJ issued a provisional order,
asking the United States to stay the execution pending an ICJ decision on the substantive Vienna Convention
claims. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, supra.
14. Breardv. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
15. See id The Court also concluded that even if Virginia's procedural default rules had permitted the
Vienna Convention claim to proceed, Breard was not prejudiced by the Vienna Convention breach and thus
would not have been granted relief. Id at 377. Virginia executed Breard on April 14, 1998, and Paraguay
thereafter requested that the case be removed from the ICJ's docket. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, Order (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10, 1998).
20051
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In the second case, filed in March 1999, Germany instituted ICJ proceedings
against the United States on behalf of Walter and Karl LaGrand, who had not been
afforded Vienna Convention protections until ten years following their arrest, long after
their direct appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief had run their course in the
Arizona state courts. 16 While Arizona executed the LaGrands in spite of this petition
and a concomitant ICJ order requesting a stay, Germany nonetheless pursued the ICJ
case on the merits.17 The ICJ ultimately concluded that Arizona's procedural default
rules violated the Vienna Convention because their application precluded defendants
from challenging their sentences even though the state officers had not informed them of
their consular protections.18
On January 9, 2003, Mexico initiated the most recent Vienna Convention case,
known as Avena,19 against the United States on behalf of approximately fifty Mexican
nationals on death row in various U.S. states.20 The ICJ, relying heavily on its decision
in LaGrand, concluded that the United States, in its arrest, detention, trial, and
sentencing of the Mexican nationals, had violated its obligations under the Vienna
Convention, most egregiously in its failure to notify these foreign nationals of their right
to contact the Mexican consulate.
2 1
16. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475-76. The LaGrands were German nationals
convicted in Arizona of first degree murder, attempted armed robbery, and kidnapping. Id. at 475. When the
LaGrands raised their Vienna Convention rights in their habeas corpus proceedings, the federal courts
concluded that the LaGrands were procedurally barred from doing so. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998). Karl LaGrand was executed on February 24, 1999, prompting
Germany to file its ICJ petition on March 2, 1999. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order
(Ger. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 12. Nonetheless, Walter LaGrand was executed on March 3, 1999 despite the ICJ
issuing a provisional order asking the United States to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter
LaGrand is not executed," id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted), pending a final ICJ decision, despite
efforts on the part of German and United States diplomats to intervene, LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 478, and
despite the Arizona Parole Board's recommendation that the execution be stayed for sixty days in light of the
ICJ case, id. at 479.
17. LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. at 480.
18. Id. at 492, 497-98. Because the ICJ decision followed the LaGrand executions, the U.S. Supreme
Court had no direct opportunity to rebuke or accept this holding in a habeas petition or a petition to stay an
execution.
19. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12.
20. Id. The original claim related to fifty-four Mexican nations, but as a result of Mexico making
subsequent adjustments to its claim, the ICJ's decision only dealt with the cases of fifty-two Mexican nationals,
with criminal proceedings taking place in the following states between 1979 and the present: California
(twenty-eight cases), Texas (fifteen cases), Illinois (three cases), Arizona (one case), Arkansas (one case),
Nevada (one case), Ohio (one case), Oklahoma (one case), and Oregon (one case). Id. at 24. For an excellent
summary of the A vena decision, see Dinah L. Shelton, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 98 Am. J. Intl. L. 559 (2004).
21. The Court noted the rights in Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention are intertwined-when a receiving
state does not notify detainees of their Vienna Convention rights, it is hard to imagine how these detainees
would then request that the consulate be informed, Vienna Convention, supra n. 2, at art. 36(l)(b), and how the
consulate would then communicate with nationals, id. at art. 36(l)(a), or visit nationals and arrange for
representation, id. art. 36(l)(c). The Court actually examined facts specific to each of the fifty-two cases and
determined that in one case the United States had not breached its obligations under Article 36(l)(b) to inform
the detainee of his Vienna Convention rights (case no. 22-Mr. Salcido), and that in three cases the United
States had not breached its obligations under 36(l)(b) to notify the consulate of the detention if the detainee so
requests (case no. 10--Mr. Judrez; case no. 22-Mr. Salcido; case no. 34-Mr. Hernindez). Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 42-43, 46. The ICJ also concluded that the United States
had violated Article 36(l)(a) in denying Mexican consular officials meaningful opportunity "to communicate
with and have access to their nationals," id. at 54, as well as its obligation in Article 36(l)(c) regarding the right
[Vol. 41:193
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What, according to the ICJ, was the appropriate remedy for such violations?
While Mexico argued that the conviction and sentences in all of the cases should be
annulled, 22 the ICJ determined, as it had in LaGrand, that the United States need only
afford "review and reconsideration" to determine the extent to which each particular
defendant had been prejudiced by the respective Vienna Convention violations. 23 The
ICJ further concluded that procedural default rules, virtually the same rules that were
under scrutiny in LaGrand, violate the Vienna Convention to the extent that they
preclude such review and reconsideration. 24  The clemency process, according to the
ICJ, was an inadequate review and reconsideration remedy.
25
B. The Medellin Case
1. Lower Courts
Mr. Medellin is one of the Mexican nationals named in Avena. Although Medellin
informed the Texas officials that he was born in Laredo, Mexico at the time of his
arrest,2 6 these officials did not inform him of his Vienna Convention-based right to
27
contact the Mexican consul. In 1994, a Texas state court convicted Medellin of two
counts of rape and murder and sentenced him to death. At trial, a court-appointed
attorney represented Medellin and did not object to the Vienna Convention violation.
2 8
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction and sentence on March 16,
1997,29 over a year before Paraguay filed the Breard case in the ICJ.
Medellin did not raise Vienna Convention issues until he filed his state habeas
petition, at which point he argued that his sentence and conviction should be vacated on
of consular officers to visit their detained nationals and arrange for legal representation (although the ICJ only
found violations of the right to arrange for legal representation in thirty-four of the fifty-four cases); id.
22. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 23.
23. Id. at 65. ("[W]hat is crucial in the review and reconsideration process is the existence of a procedure
which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention,
whatever may be the actual outcome of such review and reconsideration.").
24. Id. Specifically, the ICJ stated that procedural default rules "may continue to prevent courts from
attaching legal significance to the fact, inter alia, that the violation of the rights set forth in Article 36,
paragraph 1, prevented Mexico, in a timely fashion, from retaining private counsel for certain nationals and
otherwise assisting in their defence." Id. at 57. To the extent that procedural default rules preclude review and
reconsideration when a receiving state, in this case the United States, denies detainees Vienna Convention
protections, such procedural default rules violate Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention, which requires that
states, through local law, give "full effect" to the "purposes for which the rights accorded under [Article 36] are
intended." Vienna Convention, supra n. 2, at art. 36(2).
25. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 65.
26. Jt. App., 2005 WL 189680 at *14, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088.
27. Justice O'Connor points out in her dissent, "Medellin was arrested, detained, tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death without ever being informed that he could contact the Mexican consul." Medellin, 125
S. Ct. at 2097 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Mexican consulate discovered Medellin only because he wrote a
letter from death row six weeks after his conviction was affirmed in the state court system. Id.
28. During the course of preparation for trial, lead counsel was suspended from the practice of law for
ethics violations in another case. Br. for Petr., 2005 WL 176452 at *6 n. 5, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088. During
the guilt phase of the trial, Medellin's counsel called no witnesses; during the penalty phase, counsel called a
psychologist (who had never met Medellin) and Medellin's parents. Id.
29. Id. at *6.
2005]
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account of Texas state officials violating his Vienna Convention rights. 30 The state trial
court, and later the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, denied relief, concluding that
Texas's contemporaneous-objection rule barred Medellin's Vienna Convention claim
and further concluding that the Vienna Convention did not grant individuals the right to
raise Vienna Convention claims to attack their sentences.
3 1
Medellin filed a federal habeas petition in November 2001 (amended in 2002),
again raising Texas's failure to inform him of his right to contact the Mexican consulate
as grounds for relief.32 On June 26, 2003, the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas rejected Medellin's Vienna Convention-based arguments; 33 it also, sua sponte,
denied Medellin a Certificate of Appealability ("COA"), a prerequisite to pursuing
further federal appeals under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"). 34
In October 2003, Medellin appealed the district court's denial of a COA on several
grounds, including the Vienna Convention claim.35 The Fifth Circuit denied Medellin
relief, concluding that Medellin was procedurally barred from raising the Vienna
Convention claim, in spite of the Avena decision in the interim, reasoning that the
Supreme Court's decision in Breard is binding precedent "until taught otherwise by the
Supreme Court." 36 In the alternative, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it was bound by its
own precedent which holds that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does not create
individual, judicially enforceable, rights. 37 Thus, the Fifth Circuit's decision precludes
Medellin from the review and reconsideration that Avena requires.
2. U.S. Supreme Court
As Court watchers anticipated, on December 10, 2004 the Supreme Court granted
Medellin's petition for a writ of certiorari to address the following questions: (1) Is "a
federal court bound by the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) ruling that United States
courts must reconsider petitioner Jos6 Medellin's claim for relief under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, without regard to procedural default doctrines"?;
3 8
30. See id. at *7; Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 25-31, 45, Medellin v. State, No. 675430-A
(Tex. 339th Dist. Ct. Mar. 26, 1998).
31. Br. for Petr., supra n. 28, at *7; see Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2097 (citing the Texas district court's
conclusions of law that Medellin was "procedurally barred" from raising the Vienna Convention claims and, in
the alternative, that Medellin "[lacked] standing to enforce" the Vienna Convention).
32. Medellin argued that that LaGrand, decided a few months prior to filing his habeas petition, "controls
the interpretation of the Vienna Convention," Br. for Petr., supra n. 28, at *8 (internal quotation marks
omitted), and that the federal courts are bound by its conclusions: (1) that individuals may bring challenges
under the Vienna Convention; and (2) that procedural bar rules may not preclude such challenges. Id. at **7-8.
33. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2004); Br. for Petr., supra n. 28, at *8.
34. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 274 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (2000)).
35. Br. for Petr., supra n. 28, at *13.
36. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280 (interpreting Breard as holding that "ordinary procedural default rules can
bar Vienna Convention claims"). For a discussion of the holding in the Breard case, see supra nn. 13-15 and
accompanying text. Of course, the Breard case is the Supreme Court's response to a provisional request for a
stay of execution and not a response to a final ICJ decision, as in the case of Avena. See also infra nn. 129-130
and accompanying text.
37. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280 (citing U.S. v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001) as binding
precedent).
38. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2089 (citation omitted) (per curiam).
[Vol. 41 :193
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and (2) Should a federal court "give effect, as a matter of judicial comity and uniform
treaty interpretation, to the ICJ's judgment"? 39
Yet, Medellin did follow the rhythm of most Supreme Court cases-brief writing,
oral argument, decision. Surprisingly, on February 28, 2005, President Bush ordered
state courts to "give effect to'AO the Avena decision "in accordance with general
principles of comity." 4 1 Given the Bush administration's somewhat dismissive stance
toward international law and international institutions in the prelude to the Iraq war and
in some "war on terror" policies, this executive decision stunned international law
advocates and Court watchers.42 At the same time, Texas state officials claimed they
were not bound by the President's memorandum. 43  Nonetheless, on the basis of this




40. Memo. from George W. Bush, Pres., U.S., to Atty. Gen., U.S., Compliance with the Decision of the
International Court of Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html).
41. Id. The memorandum states:
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the "Convention")
and the Convention's Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
(Optional Protocol), which gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction to decide
disputes concerning the "interpretation and application" of the Convention.
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge its inter-national
obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Avena), 2004 ICJ 128
(Mar. 31), by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of
comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.
Id.
This memorandum surfaced as an attachment to the United States amicus brief in the Medellin case. Br.
Amicus Curiae for U.S. Supporting Respt., 2005 WL 504490, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088. The brief stated,
"[T]he President has determined that the foreign policy interests of the United States in meeting its
international obligations and protecting Americans abroad require the ICJ's decision to be enforced without
regard to the merits of the ICJ's interpretation of the Vienna Convention." Id. at *48. It further stated, id.
at *42:
[l]n light of the decision of the ICJ in Avena, the 51 named individuals may file a petition in state
court seeking such review and reconsideration, and the state courts are to recognize the Avena
decision. In other words, when such an individual applies for relief to a state court with jurisdiction
over his case, the A vena decision should be given effect by the state court in accordance with the
President's determination that the decision should be enforced under general principles of
comity.... The authority of the President to determine the means by which the United States will
implement its international legal obligations is especially important in the context of a treaty, like
the Vienna Convention, that not only protects foreign nationals in this country, but also protects
Americans overseas.
42. The New York Times reported that "Before the administration's strategy came into focus, international
law professors greeted the memorandum with amazement. 'This is a president who has been openly hostile to
international law and international institutions knuckling under, and knuckling under where there are
significant federalism concerns,' Professor Spiro said." Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World
Judicial Body, 154 N.Y. Times A16 (Mar. 10, 2005). "Sandra Babcock, a Minnesota lawyer who represents
the government of Mexico, said she had no doubt that the [Piresident was authorized to instruct state courts to
reopen Mr. Medellin's case and 50 others. 'The law is on our side,' Ms. Babcock said. 'The [P]resident is on
our side. I keep having to slap myself."' Id.
43. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Drop Capital Case Ruled on by World Court, 154 N.Y. Times A17
(May 24, 2005).
44. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2089-90.
2005]
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Against this backdrop, the Court chose not to decide Medellin's case at this
juncture; on May 23, 2005, the Court issued a per curiam decision to dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted.4 5  The Court initially reasons that "new developments,"
presumably the President's memorandum and the pending Texas state court habeas
petition on the basis of Avena and the memorandum, "may provide Medellin with the
review and reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that the ICJ required.' 46 In
other words, because the issues in the case may become moot, the Court determines that
there is no reason to decide the larger questions bearing on the relationship between the
United States legal system and the international legal system.
Given the Court's ultimate disposition, the Court's analysis could have easily
stopped at this point. Yet, it did not. The decision quickly turns to discuss the case's
procedural posture and, concomitantly, the intricacies of federal habeas law.4 7  The
Court ultimately reiterates that it would be "unwise to reach and resolve the multiple
hindrances to dispositive answers to the questions here presented" 48 in light of "the
possibility that the Texas courts will provide Medellin with the review he seeks pursuant
to the A vena judgment." 49 Thus, the Court's opinion flows as if the Court would have to
contend with several habeas-related procedural "hindrances" prior to answering the
underlying international law questions.
45. Joining in this decision were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and
Thomas.
46. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2089-90.
47. First, the Court notes that as a precursor to federal habeas relief on the Vienna Convention claim,
Medellin must satisfy the "fundamental defect" test. Id. (citing Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994); Hill v.
U.S., 368 U.S. 424 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A fundamental defect "inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice," Hill, 368 U.S. at 428, or is "an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of fair procedure," id.
Second, when a state court has adjudicated a claim "'on the merits,' habeas relief in federal court is
available only if such adjudication 'was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court."' Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2091 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2000)). Although the Texas state courts considered Medellin's Vienna Convention claims prior to the Avena
decision, these courts "arguably 'adjudicated on the merits,"' id., three Vienna Convention-related claims,
concluding that: (1) the Vienna Convention creates no "individual, judicially enforceable rights," id; (2) state
procedural bar rules preclude raising the Vienna Convention claims; and (3) Medellin was not prejudiced by
any alleged transgression of the Vienna Convention, id. Thus, concludes the Court, Medellin would have to
establish that the state's legal conclusions were contrary to established federal law before obtaining any federal
habeas relief. Id.
Third, the Court raises the possibility that the ICJ decision could be viewed as a new procedural rule
which, according to Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), would not be applicable retroactively to Medellin
because he had already exhausted his direct appeals. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2091.
Fourth, a COA is a prerequisite to proceeding in the Fifth Circuit. Medellin must offer a "substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right," id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted, emphasis in original), in order to obtain a COA, and thus must show that a Vienna Convention
violation would transgress a constitutional right, id. (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)).
Finally, the Court suggests Medellin may have to exhaust state court remedies (or show that he has
exhausted state-based remedies) prior to seeking federal habeas relief on the basis of the President's
February 28 memorandum. Id. at 2092 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
While the Court does not decide whether Medellin had satisfied all of the requisite procedural
standards, it nonetheless creates a daunting list of "several threshold [AEDPA] issues that could independently
preclude federal habeas relief for Medellin." Id. at 2090. As such, the decision becomes cumbersomely mired
in federal habeas procedures and COA standards. Thus the opinion bears little resemblance to the international
law questions at the heart of the certiorari petition.
48. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2090.
49. Id. at 2092.
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The Court's decision roused significant debate and discussion among the Justices.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, dissents from the
Court's decision, arguing that, instead of dismissing the writ, the Court should vacate the
Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for proceedings that-would ultimately resolve three
core issues: (1) whether the Avena decision is binding on United States courts, (2)
whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention creates individually enforceable rights, and
(3) "whether Article 36(2) of the Convention sometimes requires state procedural default
rules to be set aside so that the treaty can be given 'full effect."' 50 Justice O'Connor
agrees that Medellin's claim must be viewed through the lens of the AEDPA (which
requires the issuance of a COA before appellate courts can hear the merits of habeas
claims), a statute passed long after the United States ratified the Vienna Convention.
51
Yet, Justice O'Connor's lengthy dissent then demonstrates how each COA procedural
and legal threshold is arguably surmountable,5 2 concluding that Medellin's Vienna
Convention-based arguments are "debatable" 53 and thereby "warrant a COA. ' 54  As
opposed to the per curiam opinion that steers cautiously to avoid the "big picture"
international law issues, Justice O'Connor argues that federal courts must affirmatively
wrestle with such "questions of national importance when they are bound to recur.
'5 5
Justice Ginsburg is the fifth decisive vote in garnering a majority in favor of the
per curiam decision. In a separate concurrence, Justice Ginsburg contends that the Court
50. Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2098. As Justice O'Connor states, id:
At every step, the federal courts must evaluate Medellin's Vienna Convention claim through the
framework of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which controls
the process by which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief. And wherever the
Convention, which has been in continuous force since 1969, conflicts with this subsequently
enacted statute, the statute must govern.
52. The first set of claims is "jurisdictional." First, AEDPA section 2253(c)(2) requires a "substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at passim (quoting 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2253(c)(2)). According to Justice O'Connor, Texas cannot raise the claim at the Supreme Court because it
did not argue such a claim below. Id. at 2099 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The second claim involved is
AEDPA section 2254(d), which states:
[A] writ of habeas corpus shall not issue on behalf of a person in state custody with respect to any
claim "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)). Justice O'Connor states, "Whether Medellin's claim clears these hurdles
is an appropriate consideration for an appellate court contemplating whether to grant a COA, and for this Court
reviewing the denial of a COA." Id. She further determines that a state court decision, in this case the Texas
court decision, is not entitled to deference under § 2254(d). Id.
The next set of claims is "non-jurisdictional." The first involves the "fundamental defect" test. This
issue was not raised below, so Medellin did not have an opportunity to respond to it. Medellin, 125 S. Ct.
at 2100. The second claim involves a showing of prejudice. Id. Texas's position on this issue has been rather
confused. In certiorari papers, Texas stated that Medellin had a prejudice hearing in state court; in merits
briefing, Texas claimed that Medellin cannot show "prejudice in a future proceeding," id; however, this does
not answer Medellin's primary complaint that he has not yet been afforded a prejudice hearing that the Vienna
Convention requires (per the legal analysis in Avena), id. The third claim involves Teague v. Lane and
retroactivity. O'Connor responded: "Whether Teague bars relief for Medellin is itself a highly debatable
question that should be part of a proper COA analysis." Id.
53. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2105.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2096.
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should have stayed the case (and thereby retained jurisdiction), but she could not garner a
majority for this position.5 6 Justice Ginsburg ultimately votes to dismiss the writ (with
the majority), as opposed to joining the dissenters (who want to vacate and remand),
because, in her view, it offers Texas state courts an immediate and clean opportunity to
adjudicate Medellin's petition on the basis of the Avena decision and the President's
memorandum-"two discrete bases for relief that were not previously available for
presentation to a state forum." 57  Justice Ginsburg adds that the Texas courts may
thereby offer Medellin the "reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that he now
seeks in the present proceeding." 58 Additionally, Justice Ginsburg, among the Court's
most ardent proponents of transnational law,5 9 argues that the dismissal, pending the
Texas courts' disposition, is indeed most respectful of transnational comity, a principle
that she supports and that is at the core of the President's memorandum.
60
Justices Souter, Breyer, and Stevens, like Justice Ginsburg, would have preferred
to stay Medellin's case until the Texas state courts contended with the new habeas
petition. Nonetheless, as a second best course, they join Justice O'Connor's dissent
instead of the Court's decision, as Justice Ginsburg did.
6 1
In reflecting on the 2004 Term, Medellin left many questions unanswered and did
little to bring closure or climax to the evolving Vienna Convention saga. Is the Vienna
Convention self-executing, i.e., does it create individually cognizable rights? If so, do
these treaty-based rights supplant or trump state-based procedural bar rules? More
56. Id. at 2092 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justices Souter, Breyer, and Stevens would have joined in this
position. See infra n. 61 and accompanying text.
57. Id. at 2095.
58. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2095 (quoting the per curiam decision) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct., Speech, "A Decent Respect to the Opinions
of[Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Am. Socy. Intl. L.
Apr. 1, 2005) (available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401 .html).
60. Justice Ginsburg argues that comity precludes any domestic court from re-examining the substantive
merits of the Vienna Convention claims, as articulated in Avena. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2094. Thus, in Justice
Ginsburg's view, a remand to the Fifth Circuit to contemplate some of the federal habeas issues (which touch
on the merits of the Vienna Convention claim) would merely muddy the path back to the Court (with the
prospect of concurrent state and federal proceedings) in a way that is fundamentally antithetical to transnational
comity.
Interestingly, Justice Scalia, who has publicly criticized those Justices who use foreign and international
law in Constitutional jurisprudence, joins Justice Ginsburg's discussion of comity. See Antonin Scalia &
Stephen Breyer, Discussion, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Am. U. College of L., D.C.,
Jan. 13, 2005) (available at Am. U., Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin
Scalia and Stephen Breyer: AU Washington College of Law, Jan. 13, http://domino.american.edu/AU/
media/mediarel.nsf/0/lF2F7DC4757FDO1E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument (last updated Jan. 14, 2005)).
61. For Justice Souter, the "vacate and remand" route would allow the federal courts not only to consider
the international law questions but also to distinguish the Court's 1998 decision in Breard because "Medellin's
case now presents a Vienna Convention claim in the shadow of a final ICJ judgment." Medellin, 125 S. Ct.
at 2106 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Recall that the Fifth Circuit denied the COA in part because
it considered itself bound by the Supreme Court's Breard decision. See supra n. 36 and accompanying text. In
Breard, the Court faced a provisional order from the ICJ requesting a stay of Mr. Breard's execution while the
ICJ considered the merits of Paraguay's Vienna Convention claims. Even the per curiam decision suggests that
Breard should be distinguished from Medellin's case on these grounds, stating that "[a]t the time of our Breard
decision, however, we confronted no final ICJ adjudication." Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2091 n. 3 (per curiam).
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, argues that Medellin's legal arguments, particularly that
"'American courts are now bound to follow the ICJ's decision in Avena,"' are "substantial," and vacating the
Fifth Circuit's decision would importantly "remove from the books an erroneous legal determination." Id.
at 2107 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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generally, what is the relationship between an ICJ decision and state or federal courts?
And, are state courts bound by the President's executive order? The answers to these
questions may very well be forthcoming. 62 Nonetheless, for the time being, Mr.
Medellin's fate rests with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 63 So, for one who
relishes international law as a venture in storytelling, there will certainly be more tales to
tell.
1II. THE LESSONS OF MEDELLIN
Although somewhat lackluster, the Medellin decision nonetheless highlights much
about the nature of transnational law. In particular, the Medellin decision (1) reminds us
that state courts, and thus local practitioners, remain important players in the evolution
and resolution of transnational legal issues; (2) implicitly reaffirms the breadth of
executive power in foreign affairs; and (3) for those of us who are Court watchers and
vote counters, provides insight into how the Court may resolve some of these issues in
the future.
A. The Supreme Court, State Courts, and Transnational Law in Practice
In recent Terms, the Court has deliberately and conspicuously cited foreign and
international law in high profile cases, such as Lawrence v. Texas64 and Grutter v.
Bollinger.6 5 This Term, in Roper v. Simmons,66 the Court cited foreign practices,
foreign laws, and international agreements in furtherance of its conclusion that the
juvenile death penalty was "cruel" and "unusual" in light of "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 67  Many international legal
62. The U.S. Supreme Court will hear consolidated oral arguments in two Vienna Convention cases on
March 29, 2006, to determine: (1) Does the Vienna Convention convey individual rights of consular
notification enforceable in U.S. courts?; (2) Does the state's failure to notify a foreign detainee of his rights
under the Vienna Convention result in a suppression of his statements to police?; and (3) Whether, contrary to
the ICJ's interpretation, state courts may refuse to consider Vienna Convention consular notification claims
because of procedural bar rules? See Bustillo v. Johnson, 126 S. Ct. 823 (2005) (mem.), cert. granted, 126
S. Ct. 621 (2005) (mem.); Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. 823 (mem.). Neither Bustillo or Sanchez-Llamas have
been sentenced to death; nor are they members of the Avena class. Therefore, these cases are cleaner than
Medellin's in that the Avena defendants, the President's memorandum, and the concomitant questions of
executive power do not stand in the Court's path.
63. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in a per curiam order, requested additional briefing from the
parties, seizing particularly on the "several threshold issues that could independently preclude federal habeas
relief for Medellin." Ex Parte Medellin, 2005 WL 1532996 at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2005) (quoting
Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2090) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a list of these threshold issues, see id.,
and supra nn. 47, 52 and accompanying text. Oral argument occurred on September 14, 2005, and the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has not yet decided whether Medellin has met the Texas procedural requirements
for a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus.
64. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
65. 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see Levit, supra n. 3, at 163-64.
66. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
67. Id. at 1190; see id. at 1194, 1199. Justice Kennedy, for the majority, cites several international and
foreign sources, while not controlling, as instructive in interpreting the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. These sources include: African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
art. 5(3) (1990), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999); United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child art. 37 (Nov. 20, 1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (noting
that every country except the United States and Somalia have ratified the Convention); American Convention
on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica art. 4(5) (Nov. 22, 1969), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 146 (entered into
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scholars celebrate these citations as evidence that the Court is becoming an engaged
transnational actor,68 or, as some have argued, an active participant in a transnational
judicial dialogue. 69
Yet, when the Court had the opportunity this Term to decide some of international
law's existential questions-to determine when, and if, international law is actually
binding on U.S. courts; to define the relationship between the federal legal system, state
legal systems, and the international legal system; and to illuminate the often debated and
controversial questions surrounding the status of treaties and international court
decisions in United States law-the Court passed. Medellin is a potent reminder that the
Supreme Court can be a shy, reserved, and tentative transnational actor. In Medellin, the
Court thus reverts to a familiar role--one that it held comfortably for many years, indeed
for many decades-that of a passive, rather than active, transnational actor.
70
As a result, Medellin's case, and fate, rests with the Texas state courts, and
Medellin leaves some fifty other Avena cases pending before lower courts, many of
which are state courts. Thus, Medellin highlights that state courts are transnational, not
mere parochial, actors. Yet, scholars and advocates woefully under appreciate state
courts' role as a critical touch point with international law.
71
While the Texas state courts have to date resisted the incursion of transnational law
in Medellin's case, some state courts have proved to be quite progressive and innovative
transnational actors, honoring and thereby solidifying international law. 72 Consider how
another Avena case unfolded in Oklahoma, the case of Osbaldo Torres. Until the point
when the ICJ decided Avena, Torres's story reads much like Medellin's. 73  The ICJ
issued the Avena decision on March 31, 2004, and Torres was the first Avena defendant
scheduled for execution. The approach of Torres's May 18, 2004 execution date sparked
force July 18, 1978); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5) (Dec. 19, 1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (ratified by the United States, and subject to reservation
regarding Article 6(5)); Criminal Justice Act (1958), 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 58 (U.K.). In addition, Justice
Kennedy notes that the only countries other than the United States that execute juvenile offenders are: Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, Congo, and China.
68. The usage of international and foreign law by the Supreme Court indicates that "transnational legal
process can succeed in internalizing norms into the U.S. domestic system." Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth
Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 Tulsa J.
Comp. & Intl. L. 1, 18 (2004).
69. See e.g. Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487 (2005).
70. See Levit, supra n. 3; Janet Koven Levit, Going Public with Transnational Law: The 2002-2003
Supreme Court Term, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 155 (2003) [hereinafter Levit, Going Public with Transnational Law].
71. There are admittedly some scholars who discuss state courts' role in compliance with international law,
but these scholars typically view state courts as placing limits on international law-as reigning it in-rather
than progressively championing international law; these scholars tend to argue that state law, as opposed to
federal, treaty-based law, controls in certain situations. See e.g. Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does
Exist: How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 457 (2004). Elsewhere I
have reflected on why international scholars and practitioners have largely overlooked the role of state courts in
solidifying and enforcing international law, and I will not repeat that discussion here. See Levit, supra n. 3,
at 183-86.
72. See Rosalyn C. Higgins, J., Intl. Ct. of Just., Judging International Law (Yale L. Sch. Oct. 8, 2004)
(available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/AlumniAffairs/alumniwkend av04.htm) (noting that
sometimes state courts, like the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and offering other European examples,
will step ahead of constitutional courts and make decisions that profoundly impact the evolution of
international law).
73. For a detailed discussion of the Torres case, see Levit, supra n. 3.
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a flurry of high-profile, high-intensity legal activity, including an amicus brief on behalf
of international law experts and former diplomats (not a common occurrence at the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals). 74 On May 7, 2004, the Oklahoma Parole Board
recommended clemency for Torres. 75 On May 13, 2004, just five days before Torres's
scheduled execution, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, by a three-to-two
decision, stayed the execution and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine, in part, whether Torres was "prejudiced by the State's violation of his Vienna
Convention rights. ' 76 Acting under the cover of the Court of Criminal Appeals decision,
as well as the decision of the Parole Board, the Governor commuted Torres's sentence to
life in prison without parole later that day.
7 7
In a special, unpublished concurrence, Judge Charles Chapel offered his view of
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' legal obligations in the wake of the Avena
decision. Judge Chapel reasons that the United States freely and consensually signed
and ratified the Vienna Convention, including the Optional Protocol, creating binding,
contract-like legal obligations between the United States and other parties to the
Convention. 7 8 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 79 the Court of Criminal Appeals "is
bound by the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol"80 and is obligated "to give
effect" to both.8 1 The Avena decision, as a "product of the process set forth in the
Optional Protocol," 8 2 likewise deserves the Court of Criminal Appeals' "full faith and
credit." 8 3 Judge Chapel thereby concludes that his court should review and reconsider
74. Br. of Intl. L. Experts & Former Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of Petr., Torres v. Okla., No.
PCD-2004-442 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2004) (available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/TorresAmicabrief.pdf);
see Levit, supra n. 3; infra nn. 89-90 and accompanying text.
75. See Julie E. Bisbee, Okla. Panel Backs Clemency for Mexican Inmate: State Feels Heat of Court
Ruling, Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.) A4 (May 8, 2004) ("Susan B. Loving, chairwoman of the board,
said Torres's rights under the Vienna Convention were violated. She said that the board will let a higher
authority determine what bearing the world court ruling has on Torres's case. 'We'll let the governor make this
decision."'); see also Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 98 Am. J. Intl. L. 579, 581 (2004).
76. Torres v. Okla., No. PCD-2004-442, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order granting stay
of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing) (copy on file with author).
77. Off. of Gov. Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres,
http://www.govemor.state.ok.us/display-article.php?article-id=301&article-type=I (May 13, 2004). The
Press Release issued by the Governor's office states, id.:
The International Court of Justice ruled on March 31 that Torres' rights were violated because he
had not been told about his rights guaranteed by the 1963 Vienna Convention. Under agreements
entered into by the United States, the ruling of the ICJ is binding on U.S. courts.
"I took into account the fact that the U.S. signed the 1963 Vienna Convention and is part of that
treaty," the Governor said.
"In addition, the U.S. State Department contacted my office and urged us to give 'careful
consideration' to that fact."
78. Torres, slip op. at 5-6 (Chapel, J., concurring).
79. The Supremacy Clause explicitly states that "[t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
80. Torres, slip op. at 6.
81. Id. at 8.
82. Id. at 9-10.
83. Id. at 8.
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Torres's case "in light of the Vienna Convention violation, without recourse to
procedural bar."
84
What are the advocacy-related implications of Torres and Medellin? As state
judges will often be the initial touch point with international-law related issues, they
must be educated on fundamental issues of international law. Supreme Court Justices
have gained much appreciation for transnational law through their participation in
international conferences and informal meetings with their foreign counterparts.
85
Federal judges and foreign judges must recognize state court judges as co-participants in
the making and shaping of international legal norms and should open their cross-border
judicial conversations-both formal (opinion-writing and cross-citing of foreign and
international law) and informal (hobnobbing at conferences and foreign study abroad
programs)-to include their state counterparts. 86  In addition, efforts such as the
American Society of International Law's International Law: A Handbook for Judges87
are commendable, although in focusing on "problems and issues that federal judges may
confront," 88 the Handbook inevitably misses a host of issues that may arise before state
judges.
The legal brief is a prime opportunity to educate state judges on transnational law.
While Supreme Court advocacy certainly has a "sizzle," nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") and international law advocacy clinics should turn some energy from filing
Supreme Court amicus briefs to filing amicus briefs before the state courts that will often
be the first, or primary, judicial touch point with cutting edge issues of international law.
Judge Chapel, and his law clerks, relied heavily on an amicus brief filed on behalf of
experts in international law and former diplomats, 89 as evidenced by Judge Chapel's
echoing of many of the cases and arguments appearing in that brief.90
84. Id. at 11. The "review and reconsideration," Torres, slip op. at 15, will evaluate Torres's case for
prejudice, asking: (1) did Torres know that he had a right to contact the Mexican consulate?; (2) would Tores
have availed himself of this right?; and (3) would the consulate have assisted Torres? Id. at 12. Judge Chapel
thereby adopts the analysis that other lower courts have adopted in determining prejudice in the face of Vienna
Convention violations. See U.S. v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other
grounds, U.S. v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992); US. v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (S.D.
Cal. 1998); U.S. v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126 (C.D. II1. 1999); People v.
Preciado-Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 161 (Colo. App. 2002); Zavala v. State, 739 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000); State v. Cevallos-Bermeo, 754 A.2d 1224, 1227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). Judge Chapel
concludes that Tores may have been prejudiced by the state's violation of the Vienna Convention and thus
avidly supports the court in its decision to remand:
I have concluded that there is a possibility a significant miscarriage of justice occurred, as shown by
Torres's claims, specifically: that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights contributed to trial
counsel's ineffectiveness, that the jury did not hear significant evidence, and that the result of the
trial is unreliable.
Tortes, slip op. at 15.
85. See Levit, Going Public with Transnational Law, supra n. 70, at 164-65.
86. In this regard, I commend the United States Judicial Conference International Judicial Relations
Committee for including a state supreme court justice as a member.
87. David J Bederman, Christopher J Borgen & David A Martin, International Law: A Handbook for
Judges (Am. Socy. of Intl. L. 2003).
88. Id. at 1.
89. See Br. of Intl. L. Experts & Former Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of Petr., supra n. 74.
90. This dynamic-amicus brief argument finding its way into judicial opinions-was mentioned in Sean
Murphy's Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law. Murphy, supra n. 75,
at 584 n. 13. Regrettably, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals' receipt of an amicus brief in Torres was a
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As lawyers draft and structure such briefs, it is incumbent upon those training
lawyers, namely legal educators, to begin approaching issues of transnational law as
integral, rather than peripheral, to the law school curriculum. Some significant efforts
are being made in this regard. In her public speaking on transnational law, Justice
O'Connor repeatedly calls upon law schools to instill in students a duty "to respect not
only domestic law, but also the law of nations." 9 1 The University of Michigan Law
School requires all students who have entered after the fall of 2001 take a two-credit
course in transnational law. 92 Many law school textbooks in core classes (contracts,
torts, property, constitutional law, etc.) now include notes and material on relevant
international and foreign law.93 Many students, especially between the first and second
years of law school, study in a foreign country. The American Association of Law
Schools, the umbrella organization for law schools and faculty, sponsored a workshop at
its 2006 Annual Meeting, entitled "Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the
First Year Curriculum" 94 and has launched a sister organization-the International
Association of Law Schools.
95
Finally, educating state court judges requires that international legal scholars and
practitioners appreciate that most state judges do not have life tenure and thus must stand
stark aberration from standard practice, rather than the rule. When asked whether their chambers receive many
amicus briefs, Judge Chapel's law clerk Lou Kohlman answered "rarely," and further admitted how helpful the
amicus brief was in researching the international law issues. Interview with Lou Kohlman, Law Clerk,
Chambers of the Honorable Charles Chapel in Tulsa, Okla. (Oct. 21, 2004) (notes on file with author).
International law experts filed a similar amicus brief on behalf of Medellin. Br. of Former United States
Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of Petr., Medellin v. Dretke, No. 04-5928 (Tex. Dept. Crim. Just.
Jan. 24, 2005) (copy on file with author).
91. Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct., Keynote Address, Remarks by Sandra Day O'Connor (S.
Ctr. for Intl. Studies, Atlanta, Ga., Oct. 28, 2003) (available at http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_
transcript.pdf). O'Connor adds, id. at 3:
Law schools must ensure that their students are well-versed in the increasingly international aspects
of legal practice. Some schools have already taken up the challenge: For example, NYU Law
School has brought foreign law professors to the United States to share their expertise and
perspectives; Yale has established a seminar for members of constitutional courts from around the
world; and the Michigan Law School requires all students to complete a two-credit course in
transnational law.
See also Phillip Kurata, Justice O'Connor Says U.S. Will Help Train Judges in Arab Countries,
http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Feb/02-995699.html (last updated Sept. 17, 2003) ("[S]everal
American law schools, such as Yale University, New York University, and the University of Michigan, will
provide training in commercial arbitration, and transnational judgments for both new and experienced
judges."). Given Justice O'Connor's commitment to transnational legal education, it is not surprising that she
dedicated Georgetown's new Eric E. Hotung International Law Center Building. Geo. U., Georgetown Law
Dedicates Hotung International Building, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/october.27.2004.html
(Oct. 27, 2004).
92. U. Mich. L. Sch., The University of Michigan Law School Course Descriptions: Upper Class,
http://cgi2.www.law.umich.edu/ClassSchedule/CourseList.asp#FirstYearRequired (last accessed June 30,
2005).
93. See e.g. Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal & Harry G. Prince, Problems in Contract Law: Cases
and Materials 9-10 (5th ed., Aspen 2003) (noting that the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods is a significant source of contract law); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Suzanna Sherry & Jay Tidmarsh, Civil
Procedure ch. 1 (Foundation Press 2004) (discussing American civil procedure in comparative perspective);
Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law (5th ed., Aspen 2005) (including note material throughout on
foreign law).
94. Assn. Am. L. Schs., Workshop, Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the First Year
Curriculum (Washington, D.C., Jan. 4, 2006).
95. Intl. Assn. L. Schs., http://www.ialsnet.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
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for periodic re-election. Thus, even if a state judge understands how international law
may impact a particular case, that judge may be unwilling to grant international law
deference if perceived as politically problematic. This dynamic is a real problem in "red
states," or America's heartland, where fears of exporting sovereignty run deep. 96 Thus,
educating judges, alone, may not be enough-international scholars and educators must
better educate the constituents that will elect and retain judges. Here, I believe that we as
a discipline have been rather near sighted. International law, for the most part, is a
coastal enterprise-many of the great scholars, think tanks, and international law
practices reside on the coasts, and logically so. Yet, for the most part, the international
legal community does not reach out to middle America; there is little celebration of the
type of international law that impacts the small business person, farmer, or state judge.
In such neglect, we have allowed talk-radio hosts to co-opt rhetoric and mold attitudes.
Thus, we must reconceive legal advocacy as more than brief-writing and appellate
arguments-it must also encompass broader efforts to educate the public through the
media and through demonstrating how international law, if not obeyed, will have real
consequences at home, in places like Oklahoma and Texas, and not merely in
Guantanamo or Iraq. Medellin demonstrates that state courts and state officials are, and
will remain, transnational actors; whether these courts further the stature of international
law or resist international law at every turn is an open question that, in great part,
depends on the quality of advocacy and the nature of legal education.
B. Executive Power: The President as a Transnational Actor
Medellin also has much to say, albeit implicitly, about the breadth and depth of
executive power in foreign affairs. The President's memorandum of February 28, 2005
shifted some focus in the Medellin case from the status of international law to the
pre-eminence of executive power in international affairs. Recall that the Court accepted
the writ of certiorari in Medellin to determine whether an international treaty (and a
decision made pursuant to that treaty) is binding on state courts or, alternatively, whether
notions of comity demand deference to the ICJ decision. In the memorandum, the
President, "pursuant to the authority vested in [him] by the Constitution ' 97 ordered state
courts to follow the ICJ decision in the name of comity.9 8 Thus, the memorandum
inserts a distinct question in the foreground: Does the President have unilateral power to
decide when and how the United States will comply with international law and
international legal decisions?
Nonetheless, the memorandum clearly provided the Court with reason to pause in
Medellin-to avoid answering the questions at the core of its decision to grant the writ of
certiorari-and undoubtedly changed the course of the case. 99 Thus, while the Court
96. See e.g. Torres v. Okla., No. PCD-2004-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (Lumpkin, J., dissenting)
(copy on file with author).
97. Memo., supra n. 40.
98. Id.
99. Oral Argument Transcr., Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (available at 2005 U.S. Trans LEXIS 25 (No.
04-5928) (Mar. 28, 2005, Washington, D.C.)). Note also that neither the federal government nor the President
(nor any executive department) was a party in this case; yet the Court granted the solicitor general's motion to
participate in oral argument as amicus curiae. See Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 1622 (mem.).
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purportedly remained agnostic to the legal effect of the President's memorandum,100 in
dismissing the case upon its surfacing, the Court for the moment implicitly endorses the
memorandum as a legitimate exercise of executive power.' 0 ' Medellin thereby reminds
us that the executive branch, the President in particular, wields significant power in
foreign affairs. 10 2 Thus, Medellin effectively transforms the President into a dominant
player in the Vienna Convention narrative.
Given that deference to international law and international institutions is not a
hallmark of the Bush administration, it is worth pausing to reflect on the President's role
in the Medellin case and in the Vienna Convention story more generally. In particular,
why would the President have issued the February 28 memorandum ordering lower
courts to follow Avena in the first place? One can only speculate. First, the State
Department (or at least offices within the State Department) with a diplomatic corps
spread throughout the globe, understands that its employees-diplomats-are a primary
beneficiary of Vienna Convention rights; thus the State Department advocates strongly
on behalf of the Vienna Convention and implementation of consular notification
rights. 10 3  Thus, while the memorandum may on one level seem discordant with the
administration's general approach toward international institutions, it may actually be in
accord with at least one executive agency's perceptions of what is in the "national
interest."
Second, as the memorandum essentially recast the case as one about executive
power, the administration steers the Court from questions bearing on the domestic status
of international law and the enforceability of treaty obligations in federal court-
questions which the Court has not yet clearly answered and questions which inevitably
100. 125 S. Ct. at 2096 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court remains "rightfully agnostic" to the
memorandum).
101. In the shadow of the previous Term's decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding
that due process requires that a United States citizen being held as an enemy combatant must be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for detention), and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(holding that enemy combatant detainees held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay may challenge
their detentions in United States courts), where the Court arguably placed some limits on the exercise of
executive power, this reaffirmation, even if implicit and passive, was likely some comfort to the administration.
102. See e.g. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936). Of course, there are limits to executive power in foreign affairs. See e.g. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
103. The State Department works with state and local officials to further implementation of Vienna
Convention rights when a foreign national is detained. James Lawrence, a Public Affairs Specialist, is charged
with traveling the United States to train and educate local law enforcement officials in consular notification
matters. Interview with James A. Lawrence, Pub. Affairs Specialist, Consular Notification & Outreach Div.,
U.S. St. Dept. in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 2006); see also U.S. Dept. of St., Consular Notification and
Outreach Div., Off. of Policy Coordination and Pub. Affairs, Bureau of Consular Affairs, State Department
Consular Notification and Access Activities from January 1998 to January 2006 (2006) (copy on file with
author); U.S. Dept. of St., Consular Notification and Access (Sept. 2005) (CD-ROM) (copy on file with
author); Off. of Policy & Pub. Affairs, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dept. of St., Consular Notification and
Access Reference Card: Instructions for Arrest and Detentions of Foreign Nationals (2004) (copy on file with
author); U.S. Dept. of St., Consular Notification and Access. Instructions for Federal, State, and Local Law
Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights of Consular
Officials To Assist Them (Jan. 2003) (available at http://travel.state.gov/consulnotify.html); U.S. Dept. of St.,
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bear on the administration's policies in the "war on terror." 10 4 Given the composition of
the Court at the time it heard Medellin, especially given Justice O'Connor's increasingly
transnationalist bent, 10 5 the administration may not have wanted to risk a decision that
would elevate the stature of international treaty commitments and potentially constrain
its autonomy in foreign policy decisions.
Third, and perhaps most significant, the memorandum was just the first stage in the
administration's Vienna Convention strategy. Unlike the United States federal court
system, which rests on stare decisis and precedent, ICJ decisions are binding only on
parties, in this case Mexico and the United States. 10 6  Recall that the February 28
memorandum only requires state courts to give effect to Avena for the fifty-one Mexican
nationals identified therein. 107 In an additional twist, on March 7, 2005, the Secretary of
State informed the United Nations of the United States' withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention, the attendant treaty that empowers the ICJ to decide
Vienna Convention-related disputes. 10 8 As the United States no longer accepts the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in the wake of the Nicaragua litigation, 10 9 the
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol forecloses the possibility of the United States
finding itself in a similar predicament-either abide by ICJ decision or defer to state
procedural laws-in the future. From the administration's perspective, therefore, the
costs associated with the memorandum (namely re-opening the Avena cases) were
relatively low, while the benefits (derailing the case and implicitly concentrating foreign
affairs power in the President) were quite high. Thus, when one considers the
104. In other words, as Harold Hongju Koh characterized it, the administration took "the bat out of the
Supreme Court's hand." Liptak, supra n. 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Term, the Court
certainly may clarify such issues of domestic enforceability of international law in Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 620 (mem.), as well as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (mem.).
105. See infra nn. 122-130 and accompanying text.
106. Charter of the United Nations, with Annexed Statute of the International Court of Justice (June 26,
1945), 59 Stat. 1031, 1062.
107. See Memo., supra n. 40 (providing a text of the memorandum).
108. The letter read:
Dear Mr. Secretary-General:
I have the honor on behalf of the Government of the United States of America to refer to the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, done at Vienna April 24, 1963.
This letter constitutes notification by the United States of America that it hereby withdraws from the
aforesaid Protocol. As a consequence of this withdrawal, the United States will no longer recognize
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reflected in that Protocol.
Sincerely,
Condoleezza Rice
Ltr. from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec. of St., to Secretary-General, United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005) (available at
Discourse.net, US Announces Withdrawal from Consular Convention, http://www.discourse.net/archives/2005/
03/usannounceswithdrawal from consular convention.html (accessed Mar. 27, 2006)); see Frederic L.
Kirgis, Addendum to ASIL Insight, President Bush s Determination Regarding Mexican Nationals and
Consular Convention Rights, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insights050309a.html (Mar. 2005); Charles
Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases: Foes of Death Penalty Cite Access to Envoys, Wash. Post AOl
(Mar. 10, 2005) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A21981-2005Mar9?language=
printer).
109. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14.
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memorandum in a broader context, beyond the fifty-some Avena defendants, it is quite
consistent with the administration's ambivalence and skepticism toward international law
and institutions. I 10
C. Court Watching, Vote Counting, and an Ode to Justice O'Connor
In recent years, a growing coalition of transnationalist Justices, Justices who view
the Court in the context of a global legal community, have importantly steered the
Court's jurisprudence." 11 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter are firmly in
the transnationalist camp, and Justice Kennedy, with his conspicuous citations of
international and foreign law in both Lawrence v. Texas and Roper v. Simmons, appears
to have joined as well. 112 When I originally drafted this piece in June 2005, I concluded
110. Parenthetically, in pursuing this strategy, the administration evinces strategic prowess. In the wake of
the memorandum (and particularly prior to the United States withdrawal from the Optional Protocol),
Medellin's attorneys, human rights groups, and international law advocacy clinics celebrated the memorandum
as an appropriate, legitimate, and legal use of the President's powers in foreign affairs (while Texas state
officials opposed it). See supra n. 42 and accompanying text. Thus, the memorandum shifted the rhetoric of
many who had been openly hostile to the President's exercise of power in the war on terror and in other
outposts, such as Guantanamo, into proponents of the President's use of executive power, at least in this
instance. While there certainly was some backtracking when the President ultimately pulled out of the
Optional Protocol, the administration may appropriate these arguments, or at least some of the rhetorical sound
bites, in support of its subsequent decision to withdraw from the Optional Protocol and as it attempts to assert
itself in the war on terror.
11. In fact, just last year The University of Tulsa College of Law sponsored a conference on this very
subject. International Law and the 2003-04 Supreme Court Term: Building Bridges or Constructing Barriers
between National, Foreign and International Law? (U. Tulsa College of L., Tulsa, Okla., Oct. 28-29, 2004);
see Harold Hongju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets
International Law, 12 Tulsa J. Comp. & Intl. L. 1 (2004). Koh comments:
What is the core of the transnationalist philosophy? Justice Blackmun put it well in an opinion he
wrote in the Aerospatiale case in 1987. He said, U.S. courts must look beyond national interest to
the "mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal regime," and U.S.
courts must "consider if there is a course that furthers, rather than impedes, the development of an
ordered international system." By so saying, he suggested that American judges should not simply
worry about the United States of America, they should render rulings that are consistent with the
development of an orderly international legal regime.
Id. at 6 (quoting Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale v. S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555, 567 (1987))
(footnotes omitted); see also Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 Am. J. Intl L. 43,
53 (2004). Koh also comments that:
Unlike nationalist jurisprudence, which rejects foreign and international precedents and looks for
guidance primarily to national territory, political institutions, and executive power, the
transnationalist jurisprudence assumes America's political and economic interdependence with
other nations operating within the international legal system.
Id.
112. See supra nn. 64, 66-67 and accompanying text. The domestic political backlash to Justice Kennedy's
stance was fierce, with reverberations felt deep in the blistering debate over the Bush administration's judicial
appointments and the fate of the filibuster. Representative Tom DeLay stated, "We've got Justice Kennedy
writing decisions based upon international law, not the Constitution of the United States. That's just
outrageous, and not only that, he said in session that he does his own research on the Internet. That is just
incredibly outrageous." Fox News, DeLay Rips Justice Kennedy, http://www.foxnews.com/printerfriendly_
story/0,3566,154009,00.html (Apr. 20, 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another article stated:
But his ever-polite manner is not at issue; what detractors question are his judicial views. In
writing a decision this year that banned the death penalty for juveniles, Justice Kennedy bolstered
his argument by citing similar bans in such questionable arenas of human rights as Nigeria and Iran.
Writing in National Review, Mr. Bork called the decision a "dazzling display of lawlessness" that
comes "close to accepting foreign control of the American Constitution." Two marquee names of
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that the dissent in Medellin reveals Justice O'Connor as a firm transnationalist and thus a
sixth vote in a solid transnationalist majority. Unfortunately, due to Justice O'Connor's
resignation, this discussion becomes much more of a wistful retrospective rather than a
predictive prospective.
Justice O'Connor is a strong proponent of transnational law and its role in our
globalizing world, but, for much of her judicial career, Justice O'Connor's advocacy for
transnational law took place outside the confines of her jurisprudence. She has
participated in the United States Judicial Conference International Judicial Relations
Committee for a number of years, delivered numerous speeches championing
transnational law, 113 met with foreign dignitaries and judges on constitutional courts, 114
Christian conservativism, Mr. Farris and Phyllis Schlafly, demanded his impeachment. The House
majority leader, Tom DeLay, warned that Congress could remove judges who failed to show "good
behavior."
Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says A void a Kennedy, 154 N.Y. Times Al, A12 (June 27,
2005); see also H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (Mar. 17, 2004). The text of House Resolution 568 begins:
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations regarding the
meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based on judgments, laws, or
pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements
inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United States.
H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. at 1.
113. Justice O'Connor comments:
A skeptic of the relevance of non-U.S. law to the United States legal system would begin by
asking why judges and lawyers should divert their attention from the intricacies of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, or the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the Bankruptcy Code, to
the principles and decisions of foreign and international law. The reason, of course, is globalization.
No institution of government can afford any longer to ignore the rest of the world. One-third of our
gross domestic product is internationally derived. We operate today under a large array of
international agreements and organizations directly impacting judicial decision[ ]making, including
the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, NAFTA, the World Trade
Organization, the Hague Conventions on Collection of Evidence Abroad and on Service of Process,
and the New York Convention on Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. But globalization is much more
than simply these agreements and organizations. Globalization also represents a greater awareness
of, and access to, peoples and places far different from our own. The fates of nations are more
closely intertwined than ever before, and we are more acutely aware of the connections.
Harnessing the good that can come from our increasingly global world while avoiding these pitfalls
requires those with power and influence in our country to develop a greater knowledge and
understanding of what is happening outside our nation's borders.
O'Connor, supra n. 91; Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct., Keynote Address, Globalization,
International Law, and American Courts (Am. Socy. Intl. L., Mar. 16, 2002) (available in 96 Am. Socy. Intl. L.
Proc. 348, 350 (2002)) ("Although international law and the law of other nations are rarely binding upon our
decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by other countries and by the international community should at
times constitute persuasive authority in American Courts."); see Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our
Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law (Am. College of Tr. Law., Fla.,
1997) (available at Intl. Jud. Observer, Secundum Legem 2, http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc catalog.nsf/
autoframepage!openform&url=/library/fjc-catalog.nsf/DPublication!openform&parentunid=8368D2 1A74D8B
B3385256CA300696E 11).
114. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer met with European justices to discuss the
new European Constitution in July 2003. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Opening Up to World Opinion, 26 Leg.
Times 1, 1, 8 (July 7, 2003). Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, and Breyer discussed the death penalty and
terrorism with President Chirac in the summer of 2003. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Citing More Foreign
Cases, USA Today A-09 (July 8, 2003). Justice O'Connor met with Canadian Supreme Court justices in 2004.
Hope Yen, Justice O'Connor was Top Traveler on a Court with Cash to Fly First Class, Plain Dealer (June 11,
2005) (available at http://www.cleveland.com/printer/printer.ssf?/base/ispol/ 111848941681580.xml&coll=2).
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convened a conference in the Middle East on the rule of law and judicial reform, 115
supported efforts in American law schools to mainstream transnational law, 116 and
assisted in American Bar Association legal and judicial reform projects in Eastern
Europe.1 17 In fact, of all the Justices, Justice O'Connor was the "most frequent flier" in
2004, with numerous foreign trips to destinations such as France, the Hague (Iraqi
judicial conference), Canada, and Austria. 118
Yet, on the bench, Justice O'Connor's positions vis-At-vis transnational law were,
prior to this Term, more elusive and less predictable. In the 2002 Term, Justice
O'Connor concurred separately in Lawrence v. Texas and thus did not join in the Court's
discussion of transnational law. 119 In Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, upheld the University of Michigan Law School's admission practices,
which factored racial diversity into admissions decisions; 12 yet, in juxtaposing Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence, which cites international treaties in support of the Court's
conclusions, 121 Justice O'Connor's choice not to cite such treaties appears conspicuously
deliberate.
This Term, however, Justice O'Connor unequivocally exposes her transnationalist
bent from the bench. While, Justice O'Connor dissented in Roper v. Simmons, 122 she
does not join Justice Scalia's dissent in part because she disagrees with his animosity
toward foreign and international law. 12 3  Likewise, the tone of Justice O'Connor's
115. In September 2003, Justice O'Connor led a United States delegation to the Arab Judicial Forum.
Kurata, supra n. 91.
116. For cites to Justice O'Connor's speeches on transnational law and legal education, see supra n. 91 and
accompanying text.
117. Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words From the Rehnquist Court, 152 N.Y. Times 3 (July 6, 2003)
(noting that, in addition to the meeting with the European justices, Justice O'Connor has been active in the
American Bar Association's reform project for Central Europe).
118. Yen, supran. 114.
119. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44.
121. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, cites international treaties to lend further support to the
Court's admonition in Grutter that "race-conscious programs 'must have a logical end point."' Grutter, 539
U.S. at 344 (citing, respectively, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination pt. 1, art. 2(2) (Mar. 7, 1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 212 (ratified by the United States on October 21,
1994; entered into force for the United States on November 20, 1994; signed by the United States in 1992);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women pt. I, art. 4(1) (Dec. 18, 1979),
1249 U.N.T.S. 13).
122. See supra nn. 66-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the transnational law implications of
Roper v. Simmons.
123. Justice O'Connor did not believe, however, that the international consensus should outweigh a
perceived lack of domestic consensus against the juvenile death penalty. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1215
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argues:
I disagree with Justice Scalia's contention, that foreign and international law have no place in our
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has
consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving
standards of decency. This inquiry reflects the special character of the Eighth Amendment, which.
as the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized society.
Obviously, American law is distinctive in many respects, not least where the specific provisions of
our Constitution and the history of its exposition so dictate. But this Nation's evolving
understanding of human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds
with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we should not be surprised to find
congruence between domestic and international values, especially where the international
community has reached clear agreement-expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of
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dissent in Medellin is notably respectful of, if not somewhat deferential to, international
law. She opens with a compelling description of the Vienna Convention, particularly
Article 36, as the critical safeguard among the 167 state parties of "open channels of
communication between detained foreign nationals and their consulates." 124  Justice
O'Connor then contends that "individual States' (often confessed) noncompliance" with
the Vienna Convention is a "vexing problem" that is "especially worrisome in capital
cases."
' 125
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor, unlike the majority in Medellin, does not shy from
the underlying international-law questions but instead engages them.126  Justice
O'Connor first contemplates whether individuals, like Medellin, have standing to
challenge in court a state's violation of the Vienna Convention's notification procedures.
Texas, and the United States, argue vociferously that individuals have no standing in
federal court, but Justice O'Connor, after close examination of the Vienna Convention's
text, 127 expresses her strong belief that Article 36 indeed confers individuals standing to
challenge alleged transgressions. 128  Justice O'Connor then discusses the effect of
procedural default rules on a foreign national's ability to raise Vienna Convention
claims. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor notes that Breard, a decision in which the Court
privileged state procedural default rules in the face of a provisional ICJ order requesting
a stay of execution, does not necessarily control in Medellin's case because Avena may
represent "new international law"; 12 9 she adds that the Court has historically revisited
treaty interpretations in light of such legal developments. 1
30
This Term, Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence clearly converges with her speeches
on globalization and "transjudicialism." Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor will not
remain on the bench to further this transnationalist position, and her replacement, Justice
individual countries-that a particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human
rights. At least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the
reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus. The instant case presents no such
domestic consensus, however, and the recent emergence of an otherwise global consensus does not
alter that basic fact.
Id. at 1215-16 (citations omitted).
124. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2096 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
125. Id. She uses statistics to reaffirm these points: (1) in 2003, 56,000 noncitizens were held in state
prisons; (2) noncitizens accounted for over 10% of the prison population in California, New York, and
Arizona; and (3) as of February 2005, there were 119 noncitizens from thirty-one nations on state death
rows. Id.
126. Justice O'Connor argues that the Court must answer the underlying international law questions as
"necessary to explain why the COA's denial should be vacated." Id. at 2101. She further argues that
reasonable jurists could vigorously disagree on whether the Vienna Convention, the Optional Protocol, and the
Avena decision are binding on state courts or merely the political branches, as Texas argues. Thus, Justice
O'Connor concludes the Fifth Circuit should issue a COA and hear the substantive merits of Medellin's
case. Id.
127. Particularly the language that states, "inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
sub-paragraph." Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2103 (citing Vienna Convention, supra n. 2, at art. 36(l)(b)) (internal
quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 2104 ("I question whether more would be required before a defendant could invoke that statute to
complain in court if he had not been so informed.").
129. Id. at 2105.
130. Id. ("In the past, the Court has revisited its interpretation 'of a treaty when new international law has
come to light. Even if Avena is not itself a binding rule of decision in this case, it may at least be occasion to
return to the question of Article 36(2)'s implications for procedural default.").
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Alito, appears significantly less transnationalist in bent. 13 1 Furthermore, Chief Justice
Roberts' confirmation hearings suggest that he is not particularly friendly to
transnational law. 132  Thus, the Court reconstitutes with a much more tenuous
transnationalist majority as it begins the 2005 Term. This, of course, will have
implications for other Vienna Convention cases, as well as any other case involving
transnational law. 
13 3
IV. CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING:
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROGRESS
The Medellin case, as part of an ongoing Vienna Convention story, offers much
insight into how international law is made in practice, as opposed to how it is
purportedly made in the international law textbooks. International law is a process-it is
often a complex story. In the instant example, the codification and entry into force of the
Vienna Convention-a treaty-was certainly not the climax of the story involving
consular protection rights; nor was the Court's decision in Medellin. Some scholars,
most prominently Harold Hongju Koh, package this phenomenon as "transnational legal
process." 134  Others, principally, Paul Schiff Berman, offer a distinct "law and
globalization" view of international law and lawmaking. 135  Whatever the theoretical
131. Adam Liptak & Adam Nagoumey, Judge Alito the Witness Proves a Powerful Match For Senate
Questioners, 155 N.Y. Times A27 (Jan. 11, 2006) (reporting on the confirmation hearings and then Judge
Alito's cautious resistance toward foreign law).
132. David D. Kirkpatrick, Nominee's Role in Tribunal Case Draws Democrats' Interest, 154 N.Y.
Times A16 (Aug. 25, 2005); Adam Liptak & Robin Toner, Roberts Parries Queries on Roe and End of
Life, 154 N.Y. Times A1, A26 (Sept. 15, 2005).
133. See supra n. 62 and accompanying text.
134. The domestic and international process of defining an international rule, refining the international rule,
incorporating international rules into domestic legal systems, and enforcing international rules as domestic
laws, engages a multitude of transnational actors that repeatedly interact in various forums, coalesce in a type
of epistemic community, and ultimately reconstitute state interests in support of the international rule. See
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997) (reviewing Abram
Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements (Harv. U. Press 1995)) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?]; see also
Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford U. Press 1995); Harold Hongju
Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is
International Human Rights Law Enforced? 74 Ind. L.J. 1397 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel
Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational
Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181 (1996). Koh defines "transnational actors" as: individuals, corporations,
non-governmental entities, public-interest organizations, sub-governmental entities, regional organizations, and
international bodies. Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? supra, at 2626. Koh further comments
that the
[transnational legal process] can be viewed as having three phases. One or more transnational
actors provokes an interaction (or series of interactions) with another, which forces an
interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the
moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new interpretation of
the international norm into the other party's internal normative system. The aim is to "bind" that
other party to obey the interpretation as part of its internal value set.... The transaction generates a
legal rule which will guide future transnational interactions between the parties; future transactions
will further internalize those norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to
reconstitute the interests and even the identities of the participants in the process.
Id. at 2646 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
135. See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 Colum. J. Transnatl.
L. 485, 489-90 (2005) (arguing that international law demands "interdisciplinary study of... processes of
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gloss and packaging, these scholars, and the present example, importantly recognize that
the notion of "international law as treaty" or "international law as intergovernmental
organization" is a woefully static and under-inclusive way to conceive of the
international lawmaking process.
The Vienna Convention story involves a volley of sorts between the ICJ, Supreme
Court, and lower courts. While this article focuses on the role of courts and judges in
transnational legal processes, they are not the sole, or even the primary, characters in the
narrative. Parole boards, state governors, the President, the United States State
Department, the Mexican government, NGOs, law professors, human rights advocacy
clinics, and diplomats importantly contribute to the Vienna Convention story.
With each additional chapter, the sanctity of the Vienna Convention's consular
protection rights becomes incrementally enmeshed in the domestic psyche. One need
only compare the fate of Mr. Breard and the LaGrand brothers with that of Mr. Torres
and Mr. Medellin. Skeptics will certainly point to the United States' withdrawal from
the Optional Protocol as a significant retreat in affording Vienna Convention protections.
To a certain extent, they are correct, and this chapter of the story reveals transnational
legal processes as far from linear and unidirectional-there will be inevitable stalling,
changes in momentum, or even backsliding. Yet, immediately after Secretary
Condoleeza Rice announced the United States' withdrawal, the State Department
reiterated that the "United States has not withdrawn from the Vienna Consular
Convention and remains committed to its principles and provisions."' 136 No Avena
defendant has been executed since the Avena decision. And the State Department
continues its on-the-ground efforts to enhance Vienna Convention compliance through
its consular outreach and education division.
At the end of the day, Medellin reveals the Court as a rather tentative transnational
actor. And, of course, with the departures of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
international, transnational, and subnational norm development and interpenetration" and that the new
scholarship should be "truly interdisciplinary, drawing on insights not only of international relations theorists,
but also of anthropologists, sociologists, critical geographers, and cultural studies scholars"); see also generally
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (2002).
136. U.S. Dept. of St., Announcement: All Consular Notification Requirements Remain in Effect,
http://travel.state.gov/news/news_21 55.html (last visited on July 7, 2005) (emphasis omitted). The notice
continues by stating:
The obligations of American law enforcement personnel regarding consular notification and access
for arrested or detained foreign nationals are unchanged by this event. Here are the key facts:
[I] The U.S. remains a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), and all of
our obligations under this treaty remain in effect, including our obligations with regard to consular
notification[;]
[2] The U.S. is fully committed to compliance with our international legal obligations under the
VCCR, and actively works to improve compliance nationally[;]
[3] American law enforcement personnel must continue to inform, without delay, all foreign
nationals who are arrested or detained that consular officials of their country may be notified of the
detention[; and]
[4] If the detainee requests it, law enforcement personnel must continue to notify consular officials
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O'Connor, the Court reconstitutes this Term with less of a transnationalist bent, with
certain implications for future cases. However, in leaving critical questions unanswered,
the Court empowers lower courts to work through these transnational issues on their
own-Medellin thus reminds us that state courts, state judges, and all of us, as lawyers
and practitioners in the heartland, remain important transnational actors who will
continue to contribute to the ongoing Vienna Convention saga.
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